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WAITING TILL MIDNIGHT 
Japan’s Reluctance to Surrender and its Immediate 
Post War Behaviour: July September 1945 
Roger W. Buckley 
ιPresident Truman on whom I called at midday this 
morning with the Duke of Wmdsor has iust heard from 
the Swiss Charge d’Affaires that the telegram received 
from Tokyo by the Swiss Legation at Berne“did not 
contam message awaited by the whole world" 
2. The President remarked sadly that he now had no 
alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped 
on Tokyo'"' 
This paper offers commentary on Imperial Japan’s belated decision 
to surrender and the begmmngs of the Allied occupation of Japan. It 
will attempt to review recent pubhcat10ns on the endmg of the war 
and suggest that attention might now be also placed on the related 
issue of how occupations start. Those who complain that historians 
and political scientists have neglected to tackle the quest10n of “Why 
Wars Don’t End" might also note that the literature on aspects of 
what follows is even thmner. Comparative studies of post-1945 
occupations are rare indeed.'" 
On the controversial question of the circumstances of Japan’s 
surrender there is, of course, a mass of evidence and a senes of 
helpful publicat10ns Much, however, st!l awaits clarificat10n, which 
in the case of some of the participants ts unlikely to be forthcom 
ing. The recent death of the Emperor has hardly been an excuse to 
elaborate on his activities beyond endless repetition of his exceptio 
nal intervent10n in favour of surrender m the face of deadlock within 
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the cabinet and Supreme War Council ＇－＇市atis apparent is that 
lmpenal Japan’s government found it immensely difficult to 
capitulate and that the alternative option of fighting on had very 
powerful ministerial support and would have been accepted by a 
hungry, demoralized but resigned nation Japan in August 1945 needs 
to be seen as an empire that expected to resist. The military 
position was hopeless, but Japan was stil far from defeated 
Japan’s reluctance to surrender had only the faintest of m1htary 
justification The United States was m complete control of the skies 
and its navy had a tight blockade around the Japanese archipelago. 
However, American War Department reports on 15 August 1945 
stated that over 8,000,000 Japanese males of military age were stil 
left in civilian hfe, and that these should not be seen today as mere 
Dad’s Army misfits.'° Presumably any Allied invas10n forces would 
have been met with sustained resistance, though the number of 
casualties that the remaining Japanese units would have been able to 
inflict before being overrun 1s doubtful."' The fact that cabinet 
meetings m the summer of 1945 were having to be continually 
interrupted by a1r raids from B-29s and that mumtions and fuels 
were in short supply indicated that the end could not be long 
delayed. 
The poht1cal issue, however, remamed as intractable as ever. Both 
before and indeed after the atomic bombings, the agreement to 
surrender without precise details over what the Alhes intended for 
the Emperor was simply not forthcoming from the Japanese cabinet. 
Invasion under these c1rcumstances was on the cards Lack of 
equipment, food and medical care would sooner or later have 
produced capitulation, though the danger would have been that by 
such a moment there would no longer be an effective government 
stil in place to call a halt and carry out surrender terms effectively. 
The implications for the Allies of having to operate in Japan 
without a competent state structure of Japanese officials need not be 
underlined.'" 
The centrality of the fate of the Emperor to the Japanese 
Waiting til Midnight 69 
government’s unwillingness to surrender without precise and 
seemingly unrealtzable preconditions is unlikely to be greatly 
disputed. The I apanese military was not prepared to capttulate 
without gaming a remarkably lengthy number of concess10ns 
concerning the Emperor and was, of course, only eventually obliged 
to do so under duress The mt日taryhad studied the issue of 
surrender from the collapse of the Philtppmes campaign onward in 
the winter of 1944 The War Mimstry had then concluded that the 
Allted vers10n of unconditional surrender would involve: (i) the 
ehminatt0n of the sovereignty of the Emperor, (it) military 
occupation of the Japanese mainland, (ii) disarmament and 
(iv) punishment of war criminals勾 One such study had then 
concluded that 1t would be impossible to envisage the retention of 
the Emperor once Japan were occupied and the Imperial forces 
disbanded.'" It followed that the Imperial army would rather fight on 
than surrender. The complicated debate within the Japanese 
government m August 1945 concerned persuading a divided cabinet 
of the hopelessness of Japan’S position and the folly of a last stand 
The Emperor’s two interventions on 9 and 14 August eventually 
tipped the balance, although the inner cabinet continued to be split 
and, as the Emperor noted in his second intervention, 'there are 
those of you who distrust the intentions of the Alhes’.t• The mtlitary 
leaders of Japan would not have by themselves been prepared to 
stomach the American terms whereby the Emperor, under Secretary 
Byrnes’reply received in Tokyo on 12 August, was‘shall be subiect 
to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who shall take 
such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms’ω 
The Military Affairs Bureau’s opinion was that the en!tre Byrnes 
note would infringe on the 'prerogatives of His Maiesty as a 
Sovereign Ruler' and 、~as totally unacceptable.＂。 Criticsin the 
military and elsewhere doubted that the Japanese people would 
necessa口lyelect to retain the Emperor despite the commitment of 
the Potsdam Declaration to open government and democra!tc 
freedoms Japan’s elite had les than complete faith in the pubhc’s 
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regard for the Imperial institution, although the Emperor said on 12 
August that‘even rf the Alires permit the Imperial Household to be 
preserved, it would be meaningless without the Japanese people’s 
trust in it It 1s desirable to decide on the quest10n of retention or 
abohtion of the Imperial Household by the free will of the Japanese 
people’山 Japanwithout an Emperor was apparently a prospect that 
unnerved the Palace advisors more than the Emperor himself. Both 
War Minister Anami and Baron Hiranuma, the president of the 
Privy Council, were concerned that leftist elements might be 
encouraged by the occupation authorities to campaign for the 
abohtion of the Imperial institution.間
It is difficult to deny that the Emperor’S intervention, acting on 
advice and personal iudgment, made the difference between 
capitulation and fighting on The army was stil ready to do battle, 
even though the chief of the Naval General Staff had admitted to 
the Imperial conference on 9 August that 'We cannot say that fmal 
victory 1s certain but at the same time we do not believe that we 
will be positively defeated''"' A last battle would be preferable to 
surrendering without assurances over the Emperor, the disarming of 
Imperial forces, and handing over of suspects for trial 
Japan had lost but was stubborn beyond behef in Allied eyes 
Prime Minister Suzuki spoke publicly of the danger that uncondi 
tional surrender would mean the end of the Emperor and therefore 
the end of Japan. He maintained that‘＂unconditional surrender”， 
therefore, means death to the hundred million-1t leaves us no choice 
but to go on fighting to the last man’川 Thistype of rhetoric (if 
rhetoric <t was) spoke of urging the nation 'to sacnfrce everything to 
continue the war’In the circumstances Suzuki had few options 
M1htary pohce momtored peace feelers from politicians and 
diplomats, while army elements were zealous over the shghtest hint 
of surrender The Americans might be closing the ring in the first 
months of 1945, but those prepared to recognize the obvwus could 
only inch their way forward 
The question then to be asked is clearly whether the United States 
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might have done more to accelerate this highly !tmited Japanese 
peace process The additional sources recently pub!tshed are 
supportive of the view that the Soviet mtervention in the war was 
the fmal straw that permitted an opportunity for those withm the 
cabinet to have the Emperor intervene Leon S1gal claims that it 
was this factor rather than the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki that appeared 'more shockmg’to army officers, although 
he cautions that‘neither the atomic bombings nor Soviet entry 
caused anyone in the cabinet or the high command to change his 
convictions about war termination，間 Thekey to the surrender 
decision may well be the fact that the Soviet option had been 
eliminated once Stalin’s forces began their dnve through Manchuna 
Until that moment there was stil a desperate gambler’s last chance 
that the Soviet Umon could be employed to assist Imperial Japan. 
Of course 1t turned out to be a blind alley, but until this was starkly 
discovered it may be that American overtures would have been 
rejected by the Japanese government. 
The oppos1t10n within the Japanese cabinet to surrender, before 
knowing of the outcome of approaches to the Soviet union, was 
unlikely to alter. Greater pre口s1onfrom the Amencan side might 
have helped, but 1t was ultimately a Japanese governmental decision 
that could be but marginally mfluenced by the United States. 
Informal channels existed whereby Japan could contact Amencan 
sources over clarification of terms, but continued m1lttary and 
cabinet resistance left litle common ground between the two sides. 
The condittons that the War Mimster and lmpenal service chiefs 
insisted on demanding from the Allies after news of Nagasaki’s 
bombing would have made peace impossible but for the Emperor’s 
intervention, which they were subsequently not prepared to challenge 
by a mass resignat10n－＂匂 TheEmperor’s action whether he was 
pushed or he took the mit1ative 1s in doubt-was the extraconstitu-
ttonal or unconst1tut10nal measure that broke the logjam. General 
MacArthur and Sir George Sansom were later to suggest that the 
Emperor’s role was controlled by others. MacArthur mformed the 
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Far Eastern Commission’s inspection team in‘the present Emperor 
had been from the beginning to the end a puppet, a“complete 
Charlie McCarthy”， who had neither begun the war nor stopped it 
At every point he had acted automatically on advice, and he could 
not have done otherwise The Cabinet meetmg which ended the war 
was as much staged as those which began it, though the Emperor 
was certamly more enthusiastic about the former than the latter，間
Until the Japanese decision had been made, the United States 
government remained m the wings. Indeed 1t stil marked time 
immediately after the surrender had been agreed to, since it was 
through Imperial commands that the fighting ceased and the 
demobilization schemes began to function Navy Mmister Yonai 
Mitsumasa reported on 15 August that it was the Emperor’s 
personal decision，‘His, and only his. to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration on condit10n that the structure of the nation be left 
intact' The mmister concluded his message by stressing that order 
must be maintamed‘so as to prevent our nation's bemg forced to go 
back to the very beginning of its history’叩 Thewar ended, and the 
surrender process began with the necessary (1f reluctant) compliance 
of senior Japanese mihtary figures. The vast majority of Japanese 
forces then obeyed orders and returned home from their 'holy war’ 
to a society about to be transformed by its conquerors U的
The wretchedly slow process whereby the Japanese cabmet mched 
i旬 wayforward towards endmg the war displays (at charitable best) 
what the editor of The Day Man Lost termed ‘half-hearted attempts 
to surrender’J叫 Giventhe fact that Germany had been obliged to 
surrender unconditionally and had been threatened with Carthaginian 
economic policies, the response of Foreign Minister Togo to the 
Potsdam Declaration deserves to be recalled He assessed the 
Potsdam terms as 'evidently not a dictate of uncond1t10nal 
surrender，’ since he immediately sensed that the Emperor might be 
retained, and 'felt special relief upon seemg the economic provisions 
of the declaration', though Togo stil wriggled over the loss of 
Japanese overseas territories, the extent of any Alhed occupat10n 
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over Tokyo and the 'ambiguities concerning the eventual form of the 
Japanese government’問 Receiptof the Potsdam Declaration did not, 
however, prevent htm and his officials from continumg to sound out 
the Soviet Union, while attempting to persuade fellow cabmet 
members of the absurdity of bargainmg with the Allies over 
excessive surrender terms. Given the length and barba口tyof the 
Pacific War and Japan’s continental wars since the 1930’s, the 
American governmentナsresponse to Tokyo’s 10 August message 
acceptmg the Potsdam terms (with the vital qualificatton over the 
Emperor) was as much as could be expected. It did not provide a 
clear guarantee for the safety and position of the Emperor, but those 
military officers who persisted in talking of the rights of the 
Emperor as a sovereign ruler above any occupymg commander 
would never be satisfied.間 Japanreceived generous terms from the 
United States. Opposition to this “conditional” unconditional 
surrender w1thm Japan merely underlines the absurdities at large in 
her military, who feared any dimmution of the Emperor’s preroga 
tives would inevitably reduce the stature of those with privileged 
access to the throne 
The ending of the Pacific War was the result of decisions taken 
by the Emperor followmg the unprecedented failure of his govern 
ment to either agree on policy or to respect precedent and offer its 
resignat10n. Obviously without American concessions the war would 
have been prolonged, and the consequences mcalculable for Imperial 
Japan and the United States. It does less than Justice to the 
behav10ur of the American government for Sigal to claim that his 
nation 'did httle to ease Japan’s predicament’and to list the atomic 
bombing of Nagasaki and the conventional bombmg of Japanese 
cittes as 'gratmtous’and to argue that any more attacks against 
Tokyo were 'potentially self-defeating’.＇＂ What alternatives did the 
United States possess than to employ maximum force? The delays 
and divistons within the inner Japanese cabinet are an enormous 
barrier to those who would claim that Washmgton should have 
shown more mercy and patience The bitterness of the war years is 
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too eas!ly forgotten by some who argue that American pohcymakers 
should have behaved differently＜叫 It1s unconvincing for cntics of 
the Truman administration to note m the period from 10-14 August 
that ‘Amen ca’s decis10ns prolonged the 、/Varfor four days and 
narrowly missed extending 1t well beyond August 14, for the 
Japanese militarists almost triumphed m this brief period’岡
Attention ought better to be placed on the behaviour of the Japanese 
government. 
Japan’s belated subscription to the amended Potsdam terms 
provided one guideline for the occupat10n that, qmte unexpectedly 
for most observers, began so shortly afterwards If the ending of the 
Pacific War had been largely the result of a shift m influence among 
those withm the Japanese cabinet who favoured peace, the 
occupation rested on considerably stronger American direction. 
Ending the war had ultimately been a Japanese affair, beginning the 
occupation saw a reversal of roles. Certainly there remained large 
areas of confus10n and contingency, but the United States com 
menced its occupation with a remarkably pre口se idea of its 
objectives Four factors, whose relative importance was to shift 
dramatically in the next six years, deserve to be identified. These 
were ( i)the extent and character of presurrender planning by 
American officialdom, (i) the subsequent interpretation, amendment 
and, not infrequent, disregard of mstruct10ns by General MacArthur 
and his senior staff m Tokyo, (ii) the Japanese response, and 
(iv) the changing international environment. Taken together these 
items form the backcloth to a highly ambitious attempt to transform 
both Japanese institutions and behaviour 
Despite the caut10n of the Imperial rescript of 14 August 1945, 
which spoke of the certainty of ιfuture hardships and sufferings to 
which our nation is to be subiected hereafter，’ the occupation 
confounded many of these fears. While not without its revengeful 
side, as witnessed by the Pauley reparat10ns proposals and the 
Tokyo war crimes trials, the general approach was constructive. In a 
private letter of 21 October, the commander of the Eighth Army 
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could be forgiven for claiming that 'a tremendous amount has been 
done in seven weeks. In fact there are very few things that haven’t 
been done to them already＇.聞 Thepace was frantic, the tmpact on 
Japanese society immedtate 
The temptation, however, to stress what happened to Japan and to 
neglect the importance of Japan’S contributwn to the initial months 
of the occupation ought to be avoided. Even when seemmgly most 
vulnerable to foreign command the Japanese government was not 
without considerable resource. One important Japanese card was the 
position and influence of the Emperor on the conduct of the 
Japanese people in directing some of their responses to the 
conquerors. The Emperor’s role in the surrender process and his 
behaviour subsequently undoubtedly made the going easier for SCAP 
GHQ It was widely recognized by MacArthur and his staff that the 
Emperor’s actions facilitated a relatively peaceful beginning to the 
occupation羽市atviolence there was may have been more the result 
of American delinquency than Japanese resistance間 Fears of 
sabotage gradually disappeared Few American officials doubted that 
the Emperor, whatever his role in 1941, acted as an anchor amidst 
the demorahzation and confusion. The deputy chief of Government 
Sectwn would later note that, while 'it wasn’t absolutely mdispens-
able to keep the Emperor on it certainly was extremely helpful. 
because if the Emperor had been removed from office or even worse 
had been tried as a war criminal, there would, undoubtedly, disorder 
in the country. there would probably have been chaos and General 
MacArthur himself said that he would have required several hundred 
thousand more troops from the United States and possibly also from 
the British Commonwealth, especially Australia, if he were to 
maintain law and order，醐
It may be that the Emperor’s visit to MacArthur on 27 September 
1945 and the impre5'ion that the Emperor apparently made on the 
supreme commander聞 contributedto the case for retammg the 
throne. It was, however, conditwnal on Japan’s receptivity to the 
reformist intent10ns of the United States, and did not prevent the 
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American prosecution team for the International Tribunal for the 
Far East from puttmg forward the Emperor’s name for mdictment. 
Presidential mstructions may have prevented any such movement 
from succeedmg, though a large number of other governments were 
far less forgivmg and pressed for act10n.＇湖
In addition to the role of the Emperor, the Japanese state had an 
equally important second influence over the occupation in the 
American decis10n to conduct an indirect control system Instead of 
direct military occupation, the Umted States administered its 
business in Japan through the ex1stmg governmental structure. This 
policy mev1tably strengthened the hand of the Japanese authorities 
and produced opportunities for foot draggmg and SCAP GHQ 
complamts of lack of cooperat10n between its officials and groups 
within the Japanese bureaucracy. Indeed by September 1946, the 
seriousness of American objections would lead to threats of the 
imposition of direct military rule in the face of Japanese oppos1 
ti on.削 Thispresumably had already been dismissed by the United 
States as highly impractical in the first days after American troops 
landed m Japan, and would have been a recipe for chaos 1! seriously 
considered twelve months later Given the extent of American 
reforms and the lack of competent staff available to implement such 
programmes, there were few alternatives in truth, although it must 
have been galling to have to be mformed that it was al merely a 
case of the Japanese administration not being able to cope with the 
work load required of 1t by the United States間 Undoubtedlythere 
were mstances of major policy differences between SCAP GHQ and 
the Japanese bureaucracy, but these had to be resolved piecemeal 
and without resort to more mtervent10mst action by MacArthur’s 
staff. The fact that al Japanese, regardless of political persuasion, 
were umted in hopmg for both an early conclus10n to the occupation 
and constantly aware of their nation’s dependence on the United 
States for emergency food supplies and the necessary funds for 
industrial reconstruction limited any confrontation.倒
Clearly, the circumstances of employing the Emperor and Japanese 
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offrctaldom to carry out American poltcy left the Japanese state m a 
strong position It was, of course, the opposite approach to that 
adopted by the Untted States for its parallel occupation of Korea 
and dtffered in many aspects from the schemes adopted m Germany 
It has been descnbed recently by one senior participant as 
‘pragmatic’with clear recognition that the Japanese government had 
‘orgamzed qmckly and expedit10usly and put their best personnel 
mto the posts that dealt with the occupymg forces’.＇＂＇ though without 
perhaps too much realizat10n of the extent of American reform 
goals If the Pacific War had ended through a degree of bargaining 
and can be termed a“conditional”unconditional surrender, then the 
same phrase might also be applied to the occupat10n that followed. 
Short of seemingly total conventional and nuclear bombardment and 
mvasion the Truman administration had eventually agreed that the 
lmpenal !me might be retamed, and had likewise seen the advan-
tages of working through the throne and the Japanese state to 
obtain American objectives. Yet such American decisions were not 
easily reached in the face of very widespread publtc hostcltty, and 1t 
would presumably have been possible (though dangerous) to have 
disregarded the impltcit pledges to the Japanese government. Debate 
continued throughout the occupat10n over the terms under which 
Japan had surrendered and the extent to which the United States 
was committed to conforming to any such texts when conscdering 
the preparat10n of peace treaty drafts 同）
On the wider question of what the events in Japan during August 
and September 1945 tel us over why wars end and occupations 
begin, 1t 1s hard for the historian to avoid retreating to his 
convent10nal defence that the particular circumstances of the 
termmatton of the Pacific War preclude the possib1ltty of makmg 
any effective generalization. What follows goes against al umon 
mstructions, and is htghly tentative. First, it is apparent that, to 
repeat the bltndmg!y obvious, wars end when states are prepared to 
recognize what in the case of Imperial Japan had been apparent for 
many months and consider surrender terms with their opponents. 
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Domestic factors, however, may act to delay or (as was almost the 
case with Japan) reiect capitulation even though the alternative of 
fighting on would be catastrophic for the state mvolved. Second, 
there are hm1ts on the abihty of enemies m wartime to persuade by 
intensifying military force (in this case nuclear attacks) that the 
alternative to surrender is sufficiently unpalatable for the need to 
end host1hties promptly. Additional destruction, however, would at 
some point have become counter productive in that the state 
structure would have been either sufficiently weakened or even 
destroyed to make further negotiation with one’s opponent 
impractical, though in the instance of Imperial Japan the civilian 
bureaucracy was stil remarkably competent and was able to 
demonstrate this fact immediately after the surrender by acting as 
the agent for American occupat10n goals Third, concessions by the 
more powerful nat10n or alliance groupmg may stil be necessary, 
despite military superiority, unless a government is prepared to 
literally plough under its opponents. Provided the option of bombmg 
one’s opponent back to the stone age 1s reiected, then some process 
of negotiation, via intermediaries, will be required Fourth, considera-
tion of what the victor nation has m mind for its enemy after 
hostilities have been concluded 1s likely to shape this bargaining 
session The American occupation of Japan was assisted immensely 
by the decis10n of the Truman administration to retain the Emperor 
and employ his servants, even though the political necessity of 
speaking out of both sides of its mouth resulted m considerable 
ambigmty as to what exactly constituted the surrender terms and 
the legal foundations for the subsequent lengthy occupation War 
termmation needs next to be studied m the hght of what occurs 
afterwards rather than be seen merely as endgame. 
Not", 
Ii Mimster Balfour to Ernest Bevin. most immediate/top secret. 14 August 1945. 
Bevin private papers (FO sn), Public Record Ofice, Kew. Duke of Windsor's 
meeting confirmed from Truman’s Appointments Schedule for 1・：45a.m. to 
Waiting til Midnight 79 
12,15 p.m., 14 August 1945. (Box 82, P S.F., Trnman Libmy, Independence, 
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On Sic Geocge San,om to Foce;gn Office (<een by Bev;n), 31 Januacy 1946. 
Samom noted on MacActhuc’s '<0mewhat flond’but ‘cemackably Judd and 
well ocde問d<tatement of h;, pmonal op;n;on＇’thatιI may add from my own 
pcev;ous knowledge and from a good deal of ms;de ;nfocmaHon wh;ch l have 
gleaned here ;n the last three weeks, 1 am conv;nced that the Supreme 
Commander’S iudgment " correct' 
Others w;th;n the Fore;gn Off>ce held a more pos;t;ve op;n;on of the Emperor. 
See Buckley, OccupaHon n;p/omacy: BrUa;n, the US and japan (Cambddge, 
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~I General Erchelberger to his wife, Yokohama, 21 October 1945 (letters Irle, 
October 1945, Eichelberger collection, Duke University). Eichelberger was 
surely correct to list the initial changes and to doubt the wisdom of American 
public opinion that wished to see tougher treetment of the Japanese He 
suggested that 'the average American' would have difficulty in giving‘a 
coherent statement of what has been done' 
間 Eichelbergerwrote to his wife that 'several rape cases were reported among 
the Mannes when they first landed, but investigation didn’t bear out that 
th.,e things really happened. l believe it would have been easy for us to have 
had a lot of minor fittings if we had come in here swinging our fists. The 
5'me thing applies now. Beat them up, and some hotheads are going to blow 
up tunnels' op cit 
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目的 Trnnscdpt of BBC internew with Charles l(ades for forthcoming TV series 
“N叩pon” Iam grateful to Peter Pagnamenta for access to h!S research 
material on the occupation penod 
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have been the case. MacArthur was instructed by Washington not to return 
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終戦への長き道のり
降伏に対する日本の抵抗と降伏直後の態度： 1945年7月一9月
〈要約〉
ロジャ－ w. ノてックレー
太平洋戦争の終結とそれに続く連合国による日本占領は，詳細に研究さ
れるべき対象である。日本現代史を理解するために，また戦争終結から占
領に至る経過を考察する際参考となるであろう理論的基盤に立脚した上
で， 1945年7月から9月の聞の降伏受諾等の決定の遅れや政治的i昆i屯の理
由が示される必要があるロ
関係資料の一部は，すでに破棄されていたり，未公開の状態であるが
（特に，昭和天皇の行為に関わる部分） ' 1945年夏の極めて危機的な状況に
はより関心が払われるべきである。特に，日本の内閣中枢における諸決定
には十分な考察を要する。アメリカ合衆国は，大日本帝国に降伏を受諾さ
せる術をほとんど持たず，また日本の一般民衆にもそのようなカはなかっ
たのであるロ
太平洋戦争が長引く事がいかに不毛であるかを認めたくないという暗い
空気か放府内部ではなかなか消えなかった。ソ連参戦が明らかとなり，広
島と長崎が原燥によって消滅した後で，ょうやく彼らは終戦を決意したの
である。一方，帝国陸海軍上層部の見せた異常なまでの降伏への抵抗は，
連合国による占領下では，占領がどのような形態をとるものであれ，天皇
の将来的地位に関する保証が得られないのではないかとの懸念，そして軍
部自身による戦況など将来展望の判断の甘さと不可分に結びついていた。
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仮に，通常並びに核兵器を用いた日本への攻撃があれ以上長く続いたな
らば，軍事・民生両面の指揮系統は壊滅的被害を受け，米国政府にとって
直接統治以外はほとんど不可能となっていたであろう。自発的であると否
とに関わらず，終戦を決断し，連合国による日本占領を支持した昭和天皇
の行為は，もたついた降伏の後始まった占領を，総じて国家再建指向なも
のとするのに大きく貢献したのであった。
